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Previous research has analyzed the behavior of retail gasoline stations in how they 
adjust their prices.  In this paper we analyze the daily movements in prices of four 
retail gasoline stations located in Newburgh, New York.  We find some evidence to 
support the notion that the behavior is explained by menu costs.  There is substantial 
evidence that the firms adjust their prices asymmetrically, being more inclined to 
increase than to decrease prices.  We conclude that the pricing behavior is being 
determined by a combination of search costs for the consumers and menu costs for 
the producers. 
 




 Applied analysis of pricing patterns using microeconomic data is an excellent 
way to understand how best to incorporate incomplete pricing changes into 
macroeconomic models.  This paper continues a literature that has looked at firm 
level price changes.  In this study we analyze the movements of four retail gasoline 
stations’ prices.   By examining daily retail price movements our research will 
contribute more fully to the understanding of gasoline price movements, extending 
the previous research analyzing daily wholesale price movements and weekly retail 
price movements. 
 Our starting point is a menu-cost model of pricing.  We estimate a dynamic 
structural menu cost that is based on a firm’s changing its price at any time costs 
have changed enough to make a price change beneficial.  Because there is a cost that 
the firm must pay every time it makes a price change, it is not always correct to 
change prices.  We find that a menu-cost model describes the data fairly well, but not 
completely.  Therefore we conclude that the menu-cost model is not an exact 
description of the behavior of the firms but is likely affecting the firms’ behavior. 
Alternative aspects of price dynamics are analyzed as well.  Most research 
looking at gasoline prices has found substantial evidence of an asymmetric response 
of prices to changes in input prices, finding that firms are more likely to raise their 
prices than to lower them.  With retail data we also find that the firms are much more 
likely to adjust their prices upward than downward.   These findings of asymmetry 




In addition to an asymmetric response we check for a lagged response or a 
partial adjustment to changes in the input prices, finding little evidence supporting 
either hypothesis.  All three alternative aspects, asymmetric response, lagged 
response and partial adjustment, are analyzed using two econometric models, the 
Autoregressive Conditional Hazard (ACH) rate model and the logit model.  Both can 
be used to model the probability of a change in any period as being dependent on 
various factors, but only the ACH includes variables that allow for serial correlation 
in the probability of a change. 
 This study follows in the vein of Borenstein and Shepard (2002), Davis and 
Hamilton (2004) and Henly, Potter and Towne (1996), three studies which also 
looked at gasoline prices movements.  The methodology used is very similar to that 
of Davis and Hamilton.  Both Henly et al. and Davis and Hamilton analyzed firm 
specific wholesale gasoline prices as opposed to retail prices.  The biggest difficulty 
in analyzing firm specific retail prices is that the data are not as complete as the 
wholesale data.  The missing observations can vary across firms and be missing for 
many consecutive days.  Therefore, we must adjust our models to account for the 
missing observations.   
 This paper also elaborates the literature on general price stickiness, which is 
of importance to macroeconomic models of the economy.  In addition to the studies 
analyzing gasoline prices mentioned above, previous empirical work has looked at 
magazine prices (Cecchetti, 1986), catalog prices (Kashyap, 1995), industrial prices 




and Tsiddon, 1992; Eden, 2001; Levy, Dutta and Bergen, 2002; Dutta, Bergen and 
Levy, 2002; Rotemberg, 2002). 
A more complete description of the retail data follows in Section 1 below.  In 
Section 2, the theories that are tested are described, while the econometric models 
used to test those theories are explained in Section 3.  The results and conclusions 
are given in Sections 4 and 5. 
 
1. DATA 
 For this study we obtained two years of data for a number of retail gasoline 
stations from Oil Pricing Information Services.  This data set provided daily retail 
gasoline prices for individual firms, a nice feature that was not readily available in 
the past.  Having daily data allows us to monitor when each firm changes its price, 
use our time-series methods, and test for menu-costs on each firm.   
The gasoline stations in our data set were all located in Newburgh, New York 
(population 26,000), about halfway between Albany and New York City and near the 
intersection of two major highways, the north-south Interstate 87 (New York 
Thruway) and the east-west Interstate 84, leading to Hartford, Connecticut from 
Scranton, Pennsylvania.  This location had several factors that in combination made 
it a good choice. First, since Newburgh was also a wholesale location, it was highly 
likely that the stations all bought their gasoline from the local wholesaler and that 
their transportation costs would be minimal.  Secondly, Newburgh had a large 




Also, since Newburgh was located on an Interstate highway and had a local 
population, we would be examining gasoline stations that supply to both local and 
traveling consumers.  By choosing a general location, our results should be 
representative of a typical gasoline station. 
 The most serious problem with the data is that there are many missing 
observations. Of the 29 retail stations, only four stations are included in our analysis.    
Unfortunately, for many of the other stations there are too many missing 
observations to use our estimation procedures.  There are also a few stations whose 
prices are intermingled with those of other stations and because we cannot back out 
the individual series, those stations have to be dropped.  One additional firm is not 
used because it sells a brand of gasoline (British Petroleum) for which we do not 
have the wholesale prices.  Of the four stations that are included, two sell Mobil 
(Firms 1 and 2) and two sell Citgo gasoline (Firms 3 and 4).  For these four firms, 
since there are very few observations on Saturdays and Sundays, we drop from the 
sample the few weekend observations that do exist.  The exception is late in the 
sample where the data set includes many Saturday observations, but is missing 
Mondays instead.  In these cases the Saturday observations are adjusted to Monday.  
The Monday observations should be thought of as representing the entire weekend, 
since a change on any day during the weekend would be recorded in the Monday 
data.  The other missing observations pose general estimation issues, the solutions to 
which are given in Section 2, where we explain the ACH, logit and the menu-cost 




noted.  From early March to late June of 2000 all of the firms are missing all 
observations with the exception of May 19.  After we remove these May 19 
observations, for three of the firms, Firm 1, Firm 2 and Firm 3, there is a period of 
missing data encompassing all of March, April, May and all but the last day of June.  
The remaining firm (Firm 4) has a missing period over the same days but also 
including the last two days of February. 
 Column 3 of Table 1 presents the frequencies of price changes for the four 
firms.  These values show that the firms change prices on between 8% and 13% of 
days, leaving a large number of days on which the firms do not change prices.  Crude 
oil prices change almost every day, and the wholesale prices which are the input 
prices for retail prices change much more often than the retail prices.  These 
observations suggest that there is price stickiness in the data.  Section 2 looks at 
possible explanations for this stickiness. 
We follow the methodology of Davis and Hamilton (2004) and determine a 
proxy for the optimal price that the firm would like to charge.  In this study we have 
the actual input costs that the retailer must pay, in the form of the wholesale gasoline 
price.  For each firm we take the specific brand of gasoline that the firm sells (either 
Mobil or Citgo) and develop a series for its optimal price by calculating the average 
markup of retail over wholesale.  These results are presented in column 2 of Table 1.  
The wholesale prices represent the majority of the costs associated with the retail 
prices, and constitute almost all of the short-term variation in the retail price. Most of 




period were 18.4 cents/gal and state taxes varied around 28 cents/gal.  Taxes account 
for all but about 10 cents/gal in the constant term, which is close to the typical values 
found for gasoline stations.   
From the markups we can create a series for the frictionless price for each 
firm as simply the wholesale price plus the average markup.  We assume that this 
frictionless price is the optimal price that the firm would charge if there were no 
imperfections in the market. 
  
2. THEORETICAL MODELS 
 We test for four different patterns of price changes.  Our starting model is the 
menu-cost model of Dixit (1991).  Like many menu-cost models this model 
incorporates menu-costs as a fixed cost the firm must pay every time it changes its 
price.  The firm decides to change its price at any time that the current price is 
substantially different from a hypothetical frictionless price without menu-costs.  
One key feature that differentiates this model from many other menu-cost models is 
that it allows the underlying frictionless price to vary stochastically.  The assumption 
is that the underlying frictionless price follows a Brownian motion process.  If we let 
p*(t) designate the frictionless price at time t, then 
 )()(* tdWtdp σ=  
where W(t) is a standard Brownian motion process.  The firm’s decision then is to 
































The first part of the summation represents the cost to the firm of being away from its 
frictionless price and ge-ρt represents the cost of changing its price.   
 Dixit showed that the optimal decision for the firm is to choose to change its 
price back to the optimal at any time that |p(ti-1)- p*(ti)|=b.  Therefore the optimal 
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 Davis and Hamilton showed that the probability of a price change in any 
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where Φ (.) is the cumulative distribution for a standard normal variable. 
 Gasoline price movements in response to changes in input prices have been 
studied extensively.  Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert (1997), Karrenbrock (1991) 
and Eckert (2002) all found evidence of an asymmetric response of retail gasoline to 
input prices, while Godby et al. (2000) did not find an asymmetric response of retail 
prices to crude oil prices with Canadian data.  Investigations of how wholesale prices 
respond to spot prices have yielded inconsistent results.  Although Davis and 
Hamilton (2004) found an asymmetric response, Borenstein et al. found very little 
asymmetry. Bachmeier and Griffin (2003) showed that the asymmetric response of 
spot prices to crude oil prices found by Borenstein et al. disappear either when using 




Brown and Yucel (1998) suggested that how the asymmetry is specified determines 
whether an asymmetric response will be found with gasoline prices.    
 Using our retail prices, we wish to determine whether the firm is more likely 
to increase or decrease prices.  We assume that if the price is above optimal, the firm 
will raise prices, and if the price is below optimal it will lower them.  Therefore, we 
define θ to be a dummy variable which is 1 if P-P*>0 and 0 otherwise.  We then set 
up a vector of variables to test for two types of asymmetric responses used in the 
ACH and logit models described below.  The vector is: 
(2.2) )]')(1(),1(),(,[ * 1,1,
*
1,1, −−−− −−−−−= titiitittitiititit PPPP θθθθz . 
We can compare the first and third terms to examine whether a firm is more likely to 
raise or lower prices, and compare the second and fourth terms to determine whether 
the firm is more likely to make large upward or large downward changes.1   
 Davis and Hamilton also suggested two more tests of theories that can be 
incorporated in ACH and logit specifications.  The first is based on the “sticky 
information” work formulated by Calvo (1983) and Mankiw and Reis (2002), who 
suggested that firms need to take a small amount of time before realizing new 
information is available.  To test this theory, we can add into the model the gap 
between the actual and the optimal price from the day before (|Pi,t-1- P*i,t-1|) as well 
as the current gap (|Pi,t- P*i,t|).   The addition of this second variable will improve the 
model’s performance if the firm takes a while to process information. 
 The other test is to determine whether firms are only partially adjusting to 




w1i(t) represent the date of the last change.  Then || * )(1,)(1, twitwi ii PP −  is the gap after 
the last change in the retail price.  If this variable adds to the predictive power when 
included with the current gap, it would suggest the firm did not adjust fully to the last 
change.  In their analysis of wholesale prices, Davis and Hamilton found little 
support for either of these theories. 
 
 
3. ECONOMETRIC METHODS 
 One of the econometric methods used is the Autoregressive Conditional 
Hazard Rate (ACH) model of Hamilton and Jorda (2002), which is similar to the 
Autoregressive Conditional Duration model of Engle and Russell (1998).   The 
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 where wj,t-1 is the date of the jth most recent change.  Therefore the expected 
duration is dependent upon past durations (wj,t-1- wj+1,t-1) and the expectations of 
those durations.  Here, m represents the number of past durations included and r is 




either an ACH(1,1) or an ACH(1,0) model is always estimated.  The function m{vt} 
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and included so that the probability ht is always  positive but also differentiable close 
to zero. 
In the data section we mention that there are many missing observations,  
most of which appear to come from the data processor’s neglecting to enter data 
when the retail price remains unchanged for long periods.  Therefore, for most of the 
missing points we assume that the retail price stays the same as the last recorded 
price.  The exception to this rule is in the spring of 2000.  Most of the data from this 
period is missing probably because it is not being collected.  The dates for which we 
have observations for the four firms are also highly correlated suggesting that data 
were only collected on certain dates during the spring.   
This long period of missing observations is problematic for ACH estimation 
since we do not know whether price changes occurred on those dates.  To correct this 
deficiency, we remove the few observations that exist in the period and treat the 
three missing months as one gap in the data.  For Firms 1, 2 and 3, we have data on 
2/29/00, 3/6/00, 5/19/00 and 6/29/00.  We treat 2/29/00 as the last observation before 
the gap, remove 3/6/00, 5/19/00 and 6/29/00 from the estimation, and then start the 
second part of the sample with 6/30/00.  Firm 4 has similar data, except that the last 




four months from the sample may seem troubling, but there are only three known 
values being removed and since we do not know their preceding values, it is difficult 
to determine whether the price changed on those days.  
To analyze the menu cost model, we set up a structural model based on 
Equation 2.1 above.  This model allows us to estimate the values of b (the maximum 
deviation from the optimal price before a change) and σ (the standard deviation of 
the Brownian motion process for the optimal price series). 
Also, there are two ways to analyze how the missing observations affect the 
menu-cost model discussed in Section 2.  The first is to make the same adjustments 
regarding the data that we did for the ACH model, by assuming that if the 
observation is missing then it is the same as the observation in the period before.  
Since the only variables that go into the model are p and p* and they are only lagged 
one period, there is no difficulty in correcting for the long gap in the spring of 2000.   
A second way to estimate the menu-cost model is to make less stringent 
assumptions about the missing data.  Here we need to determine the probability of 
the price’s changing between t and t+n, where n-1 is the number of missing 
observations.  As described above, b is still the optimal allowable deviation before 
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If there are no missing observations, p*(t+n)-p*(t) is the first difference of Brownian 
motion which is distributed as N(0,σ2).  But p*(t+n)-p*(t) is distributed as a 
N(0,nσ2) variable because the difference of Brownian motion between dates s and t 
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where xt is the a dummy variable for whether a change occurred in period t.  
 The strength of the ACH model is that it contains the time series terms.  
However, if there is no serial correlation in the durations, this model will not perform 
well, and we may not be able to analyze the asymmetric, lag response and partial 
response theories.   Therefore we estimate the data with a logit model as well: 
















where again zt-1 is the vector of explanatory variables.  The data adjustments are the 
same as those made in the ACH and menu-cost models, and the explanatory 
variables are the same as those used in the ACH model. 
 
4. RESULTS 
 The results of the menu-cost model using the original specification are given 
in Table 2.  Both coefficients, b and σ, are significant for all four firms, and the 
ratios of g/k are small.   As explained by Davis and Hamilton (2004), we can analyze 
these g/k ratios to estimate the portion of total costs represented by the menu costs.  
If we assume γ=1 (the lowest value allowed), the firm with the largest menu costs 
would have menu costs which are 1.9% of production costs and the other firms 
would have even smaller menu costs.  These ratios of menu to production costs seem 
reasonable.  We are also able to compare the estimated values for σ  with the 
estimates measured directly.  For all of the firms the σ estimated by the model is 
substantially larger, suggesting that the estimates for σ are not perfect.  Also the 
values for b are too large compared to the size of changes that we observe.  On first 
inspection they may seem small, ranging between .1 and .2, but these are the 
minimum differences between the log values.  These coefficients suggest a minimum 
change of approximately 10-20 cents, which is greater than most of the price changes 
the firms make.  The values estimated by the model are therefore unrealistic. 
 As Table 3 shows, estimations of b and σ  from the new specification of the 




For all four firms, the values for b and σ are very similar to the values measured 
directly.  However, the coefficients are not significant.  If we were willing to assume 
that this is the accurate way to view the data, this would be very strong evidence in 
support of the menu-cost model.   
  Table 4 presents the log-likelihoods for the menu-cost model, as well as for 
simple specifications of the logit and ACH models, each with two variables included 
for easy comparison with the menu-cost model.  In the case of the logit model, the 
only variables that are included are a constant and the current gap between the price 
and the frictionless price (|Pt-P*t|).  As can be seen in the table, the logit model fails 
to outperform the menu-cost model for all four firms. 
 For the ACH model, an attempt was made to estimate a model in which the 
two variables were the past duration and the expectation of the duration.  The log-
likelihood of this estimation is shown for Firm 4 in the third column of Table 4.  For 
the other three firms, the model was not able to converge to a solution without a 
constant term.  Therefore, in the fourth column the results are presented when β is 
constrained to be 0 and the model estimated with a constant term and the past 
duration.  The ACH model is unable to outperform the menu-cost model and the 
logit for all four firms.  These results are encouraging for a menu-cost explanation, 
but the menu-cost model is only slightly better than the simple logit model.  
Therefore, it is reasonable to examine other hypotheses of pricing behavior. 
 Table 5 shows the tests of the alternative explanations for the price stickiness.  




and the current gap is significantly different from a model with just the constant and 
the current gap.  The results for the delayed information model in column 1 clearly 
show that the extra variable does not belong in the model.  In column 2, the partial 
adjustment model does a little better than the delayed information model, and we can 
reject the null hypothesis for Firm 1.  Column 3 shows the results of testing the 
asymmetric hypothesis, as θ  represents a dummy variable for whether the actual 
price is above its target price and Pi – Pi* is the interaction of |Pi – Pi*| and θ.  This 
explanation performs the best of these three models.  While only Firm 1 allows us to 
reject the null hypothesis that only the current gap and a constant are needed, Firms 2 
and 4 also have fairly low p-values (.067 and .129 respectively). 
 The encouraging results for the asymmetric model suggest further analysis of 
that model using Equation 2.2, the results of which are presented in Table 6.  The 
first and third columns show the positive and negative constants.  Across the firms 
the negative constant is considerably greater in absolute value than the positive 
constant, a counter-intuitive result which suggests that the firm is more likely to 
decrease than increase its price.  That implication is only true for very small 
differences between the expected price and the actual price.  Looking at columns 2 
and 4, we see that only the negative gap is significant for all of the firms, and that the 
negative gap is greater than the positive gap for all four firms.   Also, the coefficient 
is positive on all of the negative gap coefficients, which suggests that the firm is 




large upward changes.  The asymmetry graphs in Figure 1 clearly show that firms are 
more likely to increase their prices than to decrease them for almost any size gap. 
The logical direction for an asymmetry and the direction found by most 
studies is that the firm would be more likely to increase than decrease its price, 
which is the type of asymmetry found here.  However, the asymmetric results found 
here are different from those found by Davis and Hamilton (2004).  They found that 
wholesalers are more likely to increase than decrease price, but also more likely to 
make large decreases than large increases.  With the retail stations studied here, firms 
are more likely to raise than lower their prices for most size changes. 
 The most likely explanation for the results are search costs for the consumers.  
Johnson (2002) discussed how search costs for consumers could lead retail gasoline 
stations to be less likely to change prices in general and adjust them asymmetrically.  
If a change in price triggers retailers that it is time to search, the firms will have an 
incentive to change their prices less often.  The firms will not be able to take 
advantage of a decrease in price, because the consumers of other firms will not have 
engaged in searching for the lowest price.  Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert (1997) 
and Benabou and Gertner (1993) also explained that search costs can cause firms to 
be less competitive and therefore allow them to pass on cost increases but not 
decreases.  Figure 1 shows that the firms are very reluctant to change their prices in 
general and particularly reluctant to lower them.2   The existence of search costs does 




assumes a symmetric adjustment, but here we see there is substantial evidence of an 
asymmetric adjustment by the firms. 
 Tests of alternative hypotheses using the ACH model are presented in Table 
7.  First we test that there is no serial correlation in the durations of price changes.  
Column 1 of Table 7 shows the p-values for the test of the hypothesis that α=β=0 in 
equation 3.1.  These p-values fail to reach significance for any of the four firms. 
 The next three columns of Table 7 show that the results of the tests are 
similar to the ones performed using the logit model.  As with the logit model, adding 
|Pi,t-1- P*i,t-1| seems to have very little effect on the model.  The partial adjustment 
test does quite well in the ACH model, though reaches significance for only one firm 
(Firm 2); it is close for Firms 1 and 4.   
However, as for the logit model the best variables to include in the ACH 
model are those that test for an asymmetric response of prices.  The variables are 
significant for Firms 1 and 4 and approach significance for Firm 2.  Table 8 shows 
that neither the constants nor the gaps suggest a consistent asymmetry across firms.  
Also the coefficients on Firm 3 seem unrealistically large.3  The best explanation for 
these findings is that the ACH model is not a particularly good fit for this data set.  
This result is particularly true for Firms 1 and 3, which showed no advantage of 






All four firms show at least some evidence of following a menu-cost model 
of pricing, the majority of the evidence does not support a menu-cost conclusion.  
Even though the unrealistic estimates for b and σ  run counter to the menu-cost 
model, the values are not extremely far off from what the actual numbers show and 
are quite close when using the gaps in the data.  The most important piece of 
evidence in support is that the menu-cost model seems to be the best model for all 
four firms, when compared to the ACH and logit models.  
In analyzing the departures from the menu cost model, the asymmetric 
response is best supported by the data.  There is substantial evidence that the retail 
gasoline stations in this study are more willing to raise their prices than to lower 
them.  Neither a partial adjustment nor a lagged information model is supported 
extensively by the data.  The great degree of rigidity and the nature of the asymmetry 
suggest that the behavior of the firms is being determined by search behavior on the 
part of consumers. 
Future work should continue to analyze the presence of search and menu 
costs in gasoline markets.  In particular further work should examine whether a 
structural model which includes a menu-cost but also allows for an asymmetric 
adjustment can explain the pricing pattern of these and other gasoline stations. 
 
                                                          
1 A discussion of the implications of the particular signs on the coefficients will follow in the results 




                                                                                                                                                                    
2 See also Noel (2003, 2004), Eckart (2002) and Borenstein, Cameron and Gilbert (1997) for more on 
causes for gasoline price setting and causes of asymmetry. 
3 Note that the signs for all of the coefficients are opposite those found in the logit model.  However, 
this is what we should expect to find.  In the logit model a positive coefficient shows a variable that 
increases the probability of a change, whereas in the ACH a negative coefficient shows a variable that 
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Summary of Data 
 




Percentage of days 
with a price change 
1 437 59.65 9.4% 
    
2 437 57.61 12.8% 
    
3 437 59.98 8.5% 
    
4 431 57.12 13.0% 
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Table 2  
Menu Cost Model Estimation  
     
Firm b (MLE) σ (MLE) g/k σ (direct) β (direct) log L Obs Vars SBC 
1 0.111** 0.0566** 0.0081 0.0135 0.0194 -126.15  437 2 -132.24
 (0.016)  (0.0105)        
2 0.148** 0.0895** 0.0099 0.0135 0.0194 -162.89 437  2  -168.97
 (0.037) (0.0257)               
3 0.170** 0.0848 ** 0.0192 0.0113 0.0277 -120.03 437  2 -126.11
 (0.032) (0.0205)        
4 0.140** 0.0785** 0.0103 0.0110 0.0171  -158.71 431  2 -164.77
 (0.022) (0.0158)       
 
This table presents the results of the menu cost estimation using the assumption that 
missing observations are the same as the observation on the previous day.  Asymptotic 
standard errors (based on second derivatives of log likelihood) are in parentheses.  An 
asterisk (*) denotes a statistically significant finding at the 5% level, and a double-
asterisk (**) denotes a statistically significant finding at the 1% level. 
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Table 3  
Menu Cost Model Estimation (Alternative Specification)  
     
Firm b (MLE) σ (MLE) g/k σ (direct) β (direct) log L Obs Vars SBC 
1 0.012 0.0035 0.0003 0.0138 0.0194 -126.51 369 2 -132.42
 (0.041)  (0.0152)        
2 0.080 0.0291 0.0082 0.0138 0.0194 -154.56 365 2 -160.46
 (0.303) (0.1102)          
3 0.058 0.0157 0.0077 0.0115 0.0277 -110.33 303 2 -116.05
 (0.2180) (0.0598)        
4 0.041 0.0104 0.0042 0.0132 0.0171 -122.88 222 2 -128.29
 (0.247) (0.0640)        
 
This table presents the results of the estimation of the menu cost model making no 
assumptions about the missing data points.  Asymptotic standard errors (based on second 
derivatives of log likelihood) are in parentheses. An asterisk (*) denotes a statistically 
significant finding at the 5% level, and a double-asterisk (**) denotes a statistically 
significant finding at the 1% level. 
 




Log Likelihood for Alternative Models 
  




1 -126.15# -127.52 - -133.50 
         
2 -162.89#  -163.20   - -165.05 
          
3 -120.03# -120.55 - -124.26 
           
4  -158.71# -158.91 -165.90 -163.74 
       
 
This table displays basic models of menu cost, logit and ACH.  Each model includes two 
explanatory variables.  The best model based on the Schwarz condition is denoted by a #. 




Tests of Significance of Additional Variables in Logit Specification 
 
Firm |Pt-1  - P*t-1| |Pw1(t)  - P*w1(t)| {θt, Pt  - P*t} 
1 0.274 0.031* 0.008** 
    
2 0.663 0.153 0.067 
    
3 0.718 0.276 0.626 
    
4 0.675 0.393 0.129 
    
 
This table reports p-value of test of null hypothesis that the indicated variable does not 
belong as an additional explanatory variable to a logit model already including a constant 
and |Pt - Pt*|.  An asterisk (*) denotes a statistically significant finding at the 5% level, 
and a double-asterisk (**) denotes a statistically significant finding at the 1% level. 




Asymmetric Logit Estimates 
     
Firm Pos const Pos gap Neg const Neg gap log L Obs Vars SBC 
1 -2.9825** 0.0972  -3.4775** 0.3313** -122.74 437  4 -134.90
 (0.4567) (0.0606) (0.4290) (0.0792)   
2 -2.0613** 0.0171 -2.7912** 0.2156** -160.50 437 4 -172.66
 (0.2984) (0.0496) (0.3903) (0.0708)   
3 -3.0009** 0.0909 -3.4378** 0.1728**  -120.08 437   4 -132.24
 (0.4964) (0.0581) (0.5259) (0.0703)   
4 -2.6295** 0.0951* -3.0443** 0.2274** -156.86 431   4 -169.00
 (0.3838) (0.0423)  (0.4723) (0.0740)   
Standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the results of logit model with positive 
and negative constants and positive and negative gaps between the actual and target 
prices. An asterisk (*) denotes a statistically significant finding at the 5% level, and a 
double-asterisk (**) denotes a statistically significant finding at the 1% level. 








|Pt-1  - P*t-1| |Pw1(t)  - P*w1(1)| {θt, Pt  - P*t} 
1 1.000 0.581 0.062   0.036* 
     
2 0.266 0.858 0.031* 0.120 
     
3 1.000 0.723 0.231 0.916 
     
4 0.388 0.794 0.063    0.008** 
     
 
Table reports p-value of test of null hypothesis that the indicated variable does not belong 
as an additional explanatory variable to an ACH model that already includes a constant 
and |Pt - Pt*|.  In columns (2)-(4), the ACH model includes nonzero α and β  An asterisk 
(*) denotes a statistically significant finding at the 5% level, and a double-asterisk (**) 
denotes a statistically significant finding at the 1% level. 
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Table 8 
Asymmetric ACH Estimates 
     
Firm Pos const Pos gap Neg const Neg gap α log L Obs Vars SBC 
1 17.9076 -0.9478 13.1698 -1.0011 -0.0100 -126.04 437  5 -141.24 
 (6.5858) (0.5426) (3.0966) (0.2168) (0.0992)   
2 5.4990* -0.2115 8.9872 -0.9340 0.3743 -160.24 437  5  -175.44
 (5.3708) (0.4240)  (4.5866) (0.2273) (0.9427)   
3 22.4411** -1.0922* 18.1314* -0.6503 -0.1820* -120.70 437  5  -135.90
 (5.6623) (.3350) (4.4188) (0.3603) (0.0512)   
4 9.2613** -0.3820 11.7003** -1.1489 0.1517 -156.29 431  5  -171.45
 (2.9067) (0.2048) (2.8905) (0.3132)   (0.0793)   
 
Standard errors in parentheses. This table presents the results of ACH model with 
positive and negative constants and positive and negative gaps between the actual and 
target prices.  For all four firms the most recent past duration is also included, and Firm 1 
also has an autoregressive term included as well. An asterisk (*) denotes a statistically 
significant finding at the 5% level, and a double-asterisk (**) denotes a statistically 
significant finding at the 1% level. 
 

